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Abstract—While research on adversarial examples in machine
learning for images has been prolific, similar attacks on deep
learning (DL) for radio frequency (RF) signals and their mitiga-
tion strategies are scarcely addressed in the published work, with
only one recent publication in the RF domain [1]. RF adversarial
examples (AdExs) can cause drastic, targeted misclassification
results mostly in spectrum sensing/ survey applications (e.g.
BPSK mistaken for OFDM) with minimal waveform pertur-
bation. It is not clear if the RF AdExs maintain their effects
in the physical world, i.e., when AdExs are delivered over-the-
air (OTA). Our research on deep learning AdExs and proposed
defense mechanisms are RF-centric, and incorporate physical-
world, OTA effects. We here present defense mechanisms based
on statistical tests. One test to detect AdExs utilizes Peak-to-
Average-Power-Ratio (PAPR) of the DL data points delivered
OTA, while another statistical test uses the Softmax outputs of the
DL classfier, which corresponds to the probabilities the classifier
assigns to each of the trained classes. The former test leverages
the RF nature of the data, and the latter is universally applicable
to AdExs regardless of their origin. Both solutions are shown as
viable mitigation methods to subvert adversarial attacks against
communications and radar sensing systems.
I. INTRO
As deep learning (DL) penetrates non-traditional appli-
cations, a new research direction is emerging in the field
of wireless signals, aiming to emulate and possibly replace
certain signal processing algorithms by DL models. Spectrum
sensing, especially in the context of cognitive radio, defines
most of the radio signal detection problems that are being
addressed by DL. The approach to DL in RF domain differs
from common DL applications, such as image recognition
or natural language processing, and requires knowledge of
RF signal processing and wireless communications and/or
radar, depending on the signal utilization. While research on
adversarial examples in machine learning for images has been
prolific, similar attacks on deep learning of radio frequency
(RF) signals and the mitigation strategies are not addressed
in the published work almost at all, with only one recent
publication on RF [1]. Adversarial examples (AdExs) are
slightly perturbed inputs that are classified incorrectly by
the Machine Learning (ML) model [2]. This perturbation is
achieved by mathematical processing of the signal, e.g., by
adding an incremental value in the direction of the classifiers
gradient with respect to the inputs (Fig. 2 A), or by solving a
constrained optimization problem. Popular deep learning (DL)
models are even more vulnerable to AdExs as DL networks
learn input-output mappings that are fairly discontinuous.
Fig. 1. Stop-sign/ Yield-sign illustration of an adversarial image example
against a DL classifier (e.g., implementing the vision at a driverless car):
Here, the Stop Sign on the right is mis-interpreted as a Yield Sign
Consider the stop-sign images in Figure 1 [3]. To the human
eye, they appear to be the same – two images of a stop sign.
The image on the left is an ordinary image of stop sign, while
the one on the right is derived from it by adding a precise
perturbation that elicits the deep classifier to classify it as a
yield sign. For further details about AdExs, please see seminal
work, such as [2], [4]. RF adversarial examples can cause
drastic, targeted misclassification results mostly in spectrum
sensing/ survey applications (e.g. BPSK mistaken for OFDM)
with minimal waveform perturbation. It is not clear if the
RF AdExs maintain their effects in the physical world, i.e.,
when AdExs are delivered over-the-air (OTA). Our research on
deep learning AdExs and proposed defense mechanisms are
RF-centric, and incorporate physical-world, OTA effects. In
this work we present defense mechanisms based on statistical
tests. One test to detect AdExs utilizes Peak-to-Average-
Power-Ratio (PAPR) of the DL data points delivered OTA,
while another statistical test uses the Softmax outputs of
the DL classfier, which corresponds to the probabilities the
classifier assigns to each of the trained classes. The former test
leverages the RF nature of the data, and the latter is universally
applicable to AdExs regardless of their origin. Both solutions
are shown as viable mitigation methods to subvert adversarial
attacks against communications and radar sensing systems.
1) Existing Work: The research in the area of RF-based
DL of the PHY layer is still embryonic [5]. Modulation
recognition (ModRec) is the most popular application of DL
here. Most of the existing work is based on convolutional
(CNN) architectures [6]. Paper [7] features an in-depth study
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A: Basics of AdEx design B: Effect on a BPSK signal
Fig. 2. FGSM Attack (A) and its effect on a modulated RF signal (B)
on the performance of DL ModRec methods on OTA captured
RF communication signals synthetically designed in Software
Defined Radio (SDR). The paper [7] demonstrates that in the
ModRec context DL provides significant performance benefits
compared to conventional feature extraction methods. Apart
from exploring optimal DL architectures and comparing their
classification accuracy with state-of-the-art performance based
on signal cumulants or their cyclo-stationary properties [8],
this paper contributed a publicly available dataset [9], which
we exploit here to demonstrate detection and mitigation of
the attacks on DL that leverage adversarial examples of RF
data points. Most current attacks are based on the gradient of
a neural networks (NN) loss function: White-box attacks use
the target NN to compute the gradient; Black-box attacks use
a surrogate network to approximate the gradient. We will be
using Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] to illustrate our
ideas. This attack takes the sign of the gradient and moves the
data point x one step in that direction.
xˆ = x+ εsign(∇xJ(x,yadv,θ)),
where x is the legitimate data point, and xˆ is its adversarial
example. J(x,yadv,θ) is the loss function of the NN (with
trained parameters θ ) at the input x evaluated for the targeted
label. We denoted the targeted (adversarial classification) label
as yadv, which can be constant, or a random value, and the
hyperparameter ε is usually a small number to limit the
perturbation.
FGSM is simple and defendable (as proven in many cases
of image ML), but it is also the basic principle used in
iterative methods and constrained-optimization-based meth-
ods, hence representing a good reference for evaluation of
new defense approaches. We will not go into details due to
space constraints. Let us just mention a couple of iterative
methods based on FGSM: Basic iterative method (multiple
steps of FGSM) [10], Carlini-Wagner method [11] (similar
but modified objective function), Projected Gradient Descent
(add noise, compute gradient, step, project back) [12].
II. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES: PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider this scenario for an OTA attack on an RF DL
classifier as a motivating example (Fig. 3). The DL attacker
(DLA) is at the transmitter of a communication system. Both
DLA and the attacked system (AS) are using software defined
radios (SDRs), although the DLA’s receiver does not have
to based on an SDR. The DLAs goal is to elicit adversarial
classification yadv at the AS on the signal x designed based
on a legitimate signal of class y. Despite the adversarial
modifications targeted to elicit classification different from y,
the designed AdEx needs to maintain high probability of being
decoded as y at the attackers own intended receiver, hence the
perturbation of x is constrained.
The AS is sensing the spectrum in order to perform re-
active jamming, e.g., to jam BPSK modulated signals since
many preambles are BPSK-modulated, and if the preamble
gets corrupted by jamming the whole packet is lost [13].
Moreover, packets of the control plane of most protocols (such
as acknowledgments) are BPSK-modulated. Hence, the DLA
would want to create the AdEx that disguises BPSK as QPSK
(or other) to avoid the EW attack by the DL-based reactive
jammer (i.e., AS) [14]. Note that reactive jamming is very
difficult to detect [15], but it heavily relies on the inference
based on spectrum sensing. If the inference is adversarially
attacked, the jammer will be mitigated. We here take the side
of the jammer in attempting to detect such adversarial attacks.
There are many methods to create AdExs. By definition,
the following optimization problem describers the general
approach:
min ||rx||p
s.t.`(x) 6= `(x+ rx), and
x+ rx ∈X , (1)
where || · ||p denotes the lp norm, and `(x,θ) is the decision
rule by the NN with parameters θ evaluated at x. The final
constraint is somewhat arbitrary: it means that the adversarial
example still belongs to the same space as the legitimate data
point.
In the case of images the slight perturbation applied to a
legitimate data example is expressed as visual imperceptibility
by a human viewer. RF adversarial examples is a nascent
field, and as such the definition of imperceptible perturbation
does not exist in the literature. For RF signals utilized for
communications we define the imperceptible perturbation as
any deformation of the RF waveform that can be filtered out by
a receiver, e.g. via matched filters or correction codes, such
that the bit-error rate is close to that of legitimate signals.
An analogous definition can be made for radar using receiver
operating characteristics (ROC).
Mitigating adversarial inputs remains an open problem, even
in the image-domain. A complicating factor in detecting AdEx
attacks include variations due to the physical world. Visual
adversarial perturbations and their robustness given different
backgrounds, lighting, and camera resolutions is discussed in
[16]. The diversity of RF communications, radar, and spectrum
sensing systems, and complex propagation channels makes this
problem in the RF domain even more complex and unique. We
overcome this through proper consideration and modeling of
the both hardware and the channel.
As mentioned, the defense mechanisms that we are propos-
ing rely on statistical tests. The idea of using statistical tests to
detect and discard adversarial examples is not new. Common
approaches to defense against adversarial attacks (mainly eval-
Fig. 3. Motivating scenario for an OTA attack to DL classifier via RF AdExs
uated on image datasets) include: Gradient masking - hiding
the gradient; Preprocessing - trying to undo the perturbations;
Detecting AdExs - looking for distribution shifts; Certified
methods - proving immunity to a set of perturbations. For
details please see [17] and references therein. We focus on the
uniqueness of RF data and its delivery to DL-based inference
systems to defend against RF adversarial attacks. For example,
the detection of AdExs using statistics designed for images
does not transfer to RF, as some statistics are destroyed during
OTA delivery. The effect of the channel (or interference)
which is mitigated in well-designed receivers will persist at
the DL classifier, thus changing the classification for both
legitimate inputs and AdExs. Our first statistical test utilizes
PAPR statistics, which is a widely adopted and studied metric
in wireless communications, and represents a signature for a
particular modulation. If the classified label of an input signal
indicates a specific modulation, and its PAPR statistic indicates
the opposite with high confidence, additional tests should be
performed to confirm or reject suspicion. The second test that
we propose is universal, and relies on the statistics of the last
layer of the neural network to detect a distribution shift caused
by adversarial examples. Typically, the size of the statistics
affects the quality of the tests, and we compare the confidence
of the tests utilizing the entire corpus of the training data
versus those that utilize only the statistics of inputs whose
total duration is hundreds of microseconds or less.
Finally, adversarial training of neural networks is another
common defense, and often complimentary to other methods.
It consists of generating the AdExs according to one or more
attack methods, and retraining the NN with labeled AdExs. We
use adversarial training in conjunction with other mitigation
and defense methods.
There are some complexities in DL of RF signals that we
would like to highlight since our approach to solving those
complexities impacts the presented results. Raw RF signal data
is complex-valued, and traditionally split into the in-phase (I)
and quadrature (Q) channels, resulting in a series of I + jQ
samples. Standard DL networks are not designed to handle
complex-valued data, hence we must apply a transform to
the real domain that preserves salient signal information. Our
prior research leveraged expert feature transforms (e.g. FFTs,
wavelets) to optimize performance by reducing the complexity
(e.g. number of NN parameters) of the proceeding network.
For this research we used interleaved I/Q samples of the
DeepSig dataset comprised of synthetic data points from 24
modulation classes [9]. This simple transform from complex to
Fig. 4. Motivating example for PAPR based detection of AdExs
real set, could be expressed as follows: for a data point c of k
I/Q samples c1, · · · ,ck, where c` = I`+ j∗Q`, the transformed
vector has 2k real elements [I1,Q1, I2,Q2, · · · , Ik,Qk] . For the
Deepsig dataset that we used k = 1024, hence the input to the
NN is a tensor of dimensions (·,2048) . Note that despite the
conversion from complex data to the interleaved I/Q transform
the accuracy of classifying four modulations represented by a
subset of the DeepSig dataset gets close to 100% if data points
with SNR≥ 14 dB are used (see 5). Adversarial examples with
ε = 0.1 lower the accuracy by 30-40% on average.
III. PROPOSED METHODS FOR MITIGATION AND DEFENSE
All the results presented here are based on a subset of
the DeepSig dataset (9) specifically, we used BPSK, QPSK,
8PSK and 16QAM (DeepSig classes 3, 4 ,5, 12). We applied
the FGSM attack using the CleverHans library (12). We
compared results with and without the attack using outlined
defense methods, including: 1) statistical detection of AdExs
by comparing the distribution of the output values at the
final NN layer with and without an attack, by means of
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two-sample test (see [18]
and references therein); 2) statistical detection of AdExs by
computing PAPR for each data point with and without an
attack and then applying the KS test between respective PAPR
statistics.
Let us look at the plot of the RF waveforms recovered from
the legitimate data points and their adversarial examples, as
presented in Figure 4 on the example of a QPSK data point.
Notice that the AdExs plotted in red at the top of Figure 4 are
almost visually imperceptible, yet they cause an evident drop
in accuracy (see Figure 5). The bottom of Figure 4 shows
that even though the interleaved I and Q parts (samples of
a data point under attack in the top plot) are not visually
changed much for a small perturbation (FGSM with = 0.1),
the induced change in the amplitude of the signal (bottom)
is more pronounced. Even so, using amplitude statistics to
detect an adversarial attack would not be robust in an OTA
scenario (due to unknown channel conditions, including the
distance-based attenuation and other effects of the wireless
environment). However, a metric such as Peak-to-Average-
Power Ratio (PAPR) will likely be more robust for linear
time-invariant channels since the channel will treat equally
both high and low amplitudes. Since PAPR depends on the
data content, and 1024 samples is roughly 100 symbols in our
dataset, then for BPSK this is enough to achieve statistical di-
versity and yield a stationary signal. Higher order modulations
may need more samples for PAPR to be a sufficiently good
statistic, which the results presented below illustrate.
The test that utilizes the output of the Softmax layer is mo-
tivated by Figures 6 and 7. For the sake of visualization, both
figures are based on the 3-class classifier trained on BPSK,
QPSK and 8-PSK modulation data points. Hence, the outputs
of the Softmax layer are 3-dimensional vectors that are plotted
in the figures for all data points utilized for training (close to
20,000, shown on the left), and for their adversarial examples,
shown in the plot on the right. The elements of the vectors
are values between 0 and 1, representing the probabilities of
the classes. Figure 7 shows these vectors after 20 epochs
of training, upon the convergence of the loss function and
after the achieved accuracy exceeded 99%. Observe that for
legitimate examples, the BPSK-classified data points (purple)
cluster in the area close to the vertex (1,0,0), denoting the
probability of 1 for BPSK and 0 for QPSK and 8-PSK.
Similarly, the points classified as QPSK and 8-PSK cluster
around the vertices corresponding to probability of 1 for QPSK
and 8-PSK, respectively. The left-hand side of Figure 7 shows
that for the adversarial examples the vectors are distributed
across a wide range of values, and the clusterization effect is
lost.
Figure 6 shows the same vectors after just 2 epochs of
training and no clusterization is apparent in either plot due
to an untrained network, and the low accuracy for both
legitimate and adversarial examples. This emphasizes the need
to evaluate the adversarial effects on a completely trained
network.
A. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for Adversarial PAPR
We compute PAPR for each data point and the Adversarial
PAPR (APAPR) for its AdEx, and conduct statistical tests
whether PAPRs and APAPRs belong to the same probability
distribution. This is a model-agnostic defense that leverages
RF signal properties. We ran 2 test experiments, with inde-
pendent attack instances. Both included comparing the entire
set of PAPRs with matching APAPRs, and then the comparison
of small sets — first with 50 PAPRs in the sample, and second
with 200. Small sets are compared to capture the effect of the
sample size on the KS test confidence (Fig. 9). Columns of
the tables in Fig. 9 show for each experiment the 3 instances
Fig. 5. Accuracy over training epochs for our CNN trained on classes 3,4,5
and 12 (BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK,16QAM)
A: Output for legitimate data B: Output for AdExs
Fig. 6. Classification of 3 modulations (BPSK, QPSK,8-PSK) shows dif-
ferent distribution of output probabilities between legitimate and adversarial
examples even after 2 training epochs
of the 2-sample KS test between the PAPRs and APAPRs: 1)
Entire PAPR dataset per class vs. entire APAPR dataset per
predicted class; 2) A random set of 50 (or 200) PAPR values
of the same class vs a random set of 50 (or 200) same class
APAPR values 3) Control instance (PAPR to PAPR, per class)
with a random set of 50 (200) PAPR values vs another random
set of 50 (200) legitimate PAPR values. The 3rd instance is
the control experiment.
The KS test declares the confidence (p-value) that the two
sets of statistics are from the same distribution. Tables in 9
display those confidence values for the 3 instances. Small
confidence in the 1st and 2nd column show that AdExs are not
drawn from the same distribution as the original data, and can
thus be detected using this test. The 3rd column quantifies
the confidence in such a claim, with one being the highest
confidence. The smaller number of malicious points included
in the tested sample (50) resulted in much lower detection
confidence, especially for low-order modulations (as evident
in Table 1 vs Table 2, 3rd column). Table 2 shows only slight
improvement in the 3rd column for 16QAM as the highest
order modulation needs more than 1024 samples to create good
PAPR statistics.
A: Output for legitimate data B: Output for AdExs
Fig. 7. Classification of 3 modulations (BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK) shows very
different distribution of output probabilities between legitimate and adversarial
examples after 20 training epochs
Table 1 Table 2
Fig. 8. KS test results, based on PAPR statistics, for an experiment with a
control set of 50 PAPR samples (left), and of 200 samples (right)
B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Output Layer Probabilities
This KS test is performed in the same manner as the previ-
ous one, with two experiments and three instances. The only
difference is the statistics applied to evaluate the equality of
probability distributions between the two samples of statistics.
The statistic in matter is the empirical entropy H of each data
point x, calculated as:
H(x) =
C
∑
i=1
pi(x) log pi(x),
where C is the number of classes, and [p1(x) · · · , pC(x)] is the
vector of the class probabilities at the output layer, evaluated
for data point x. We define the same statistic for the adversarial
examples.
Figure 9 shows the two experiments, with 50 H(x) control
samples on the left, and with 200 H(x) control samples on
the left. Note that the confidence that legitimate samples and
AdEx samples are from the same distribution is about zero in
the first column for all modulations, and similarly for smaller
sets of 50 or 200 statistics (second column). The third column
shows what is the confidence when we use the legitimate data
points to calculate the statistics of both KS samples. Ideally, it
should be close to one, and more so for 200 than for 50 entropy
values. The closer the third column is to one the more valid the
confidence values in the first two columns are. We see that the
increase of the control confidence with the larger set size (in
the second table) is largest for the highest-order modulation
Table 1 Table 2
Fig. 9. KS test results, based on output layer probabilities, for an experiment
with a control set of 50 output layer samples (left), and of 200 samples (right)
here (the last row, marked with the arrow). However, despite
the values in the third column not converging to one for the
presented sizes, we can better see the validity of the test if we
equate those values with maximum probability of the same-
distribution hypothesis (100 %); in that case the probability
that adversarial and legitimate samples from the other two
columns are drawn from the same probability is close to 0%.
The KS test based on the entropy of output layer proba-
bilities will likely show different results when evaluated at
a classifier that is trained on clean RF samples but receives
the data points OTA, causing a distribution shift due to the
channel effects. We do not evaluate these effects here, due to
the lack of space. Our intention in this paper is to show that
for data points representing differently modulated RF signals
this test promises fairly reliable detection of the distribution
shift caused by the intentional and malicious perturbations
implemented by adversarial examples.
The DL NN used with both this and the PAPR test is a CNN
of similar architecture as used for the 1st defense method.
Normally trained CNN exhibits test accuracy of 0.9988 on
legitimate examples and test accuracy 0.4815 on the 0.1 FGSM
AdExs. The adversarially-trained CNN exhibits test accuracy
of 0.9991 on legitimate examples and test accuracy 0.7659 on
the 0.1-FGSM AdExs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We showed that statistical tests based on PAPR values of
data points, and on the probability of classes derived from
the last NN layer, can detect a distribution shift created by
adversarial examples. While the PAPR statistics are more
robust to the over-the-air delivery of RF data points, this
paper does not assert that this is true for the test based on
class probabilities. Our future research will investigate the
robustness of the latter. Other statistics could be used to detect
the distribution shift, which is outside the scope of this paper.
We used the two methods to represent two classes of test
statistics, those that are robust to wireless corruption, and
those that are not. There are additional defense methods that
are not based on statistical tests, whose validity should be
verified in terms of robustness to corruption incurred at the
receiver due to OTA delivery. As an example, we would like
to mention additional methods that we pursued in this line of
research. Defense against AdExs by pretraining the network by
an autoencoder (AE) mitigates the deceiving effect of AdExs,
but expanding the AE-based defense to a denoising AE is
likely to increase its robustness against the receiver noise.
The robustness of the attacks to deep learning via adversarial
examples, and of the defense mechanisms against them is an
open problem, and this paper is an attempt to address its
manifestations and specificity in the RF domain.
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